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Abstract 
This article puts the current cooperative pattern of state-nonprofit relations in France into 
historical context against the country’s statist past and suggests the implications this experience 
may have for other countries that share the statist background that France, perhaps in somewhat 
different form, also embodies. To do so, the discussion first reviews the current shape of the 
French nonprofit sector and the substantial scope and structure of government support of 
nonprofit human service delivery that exists. It then examines the unfavorable historical 
background out of which the current arrangements emerged and the set of changes that 
ultimately led to the existing pattern of extensive government-nonprofit cooperation. Against 
this background, a third section then looks more closely at the tools of action French 
governments are bringing to bear in their relations with nonprofits, the advantages and 
drawbacks of each, and the nonprofit role in the formulation of public policies. Finally, the 
article examines the key challenges in government-nonprofit cooperation in the provision of 
human services and the lessons the French experience might hold for Russia and other similar 
countries. 
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<H1>Introduction 
 
The French nonprofit sector is large and growing. The number of nonprofit organizations in 
2012 was about 1.3 million, operating mainly in two unequal legal statuses: 1,300,000 
associations, and less than 2000 independent foundations. Most of the associations are 
grassroots organizations run by volunteers, spread all over France in a living social network. 
Nevertheless, the 160,000 nonprofit organizations managed by paid staff still make the French 
nonprofit sector a major employer, with 10% of private employment and 7.5% of the country’s 
total full-time employment (7.2% in associations and 0.3% in foundations). In addition, 
employment grew twice as fast in the nonprofit sector than in the business and public sectors 
during the last three decades (INSEE-CLAP 2012; Tchernonog 2013; De Laurens 2013; 
Archambault et. al. 2014).  
Remarkably, but not well recognized, the emergence of this sizable nonprofit sector is a 
relatively recent development in France, the product of a dramatic shift in government policies 
initiated by the left-leaning government of Francois Mitterrand in the early 1980s. These 
policies led to a significant decentralization of governmental responsibilities, particularly in the 
human service field, and a widespread pattern of local or regional government contracting with 
private nonprofit organizations.
b
 
Prior to this, and certainly prior to the 1960s, France was characterized by a strong statist 
tradition dating back at least to the 1789 Revolution. Under this tradition, nonprofit 
organizations were at first outlawed, and subsequently discouraged, as the embodiments of 
partial interests at odds with the general interest represented by the democratic state. Consistent 
with this tradition, social welfare services were considered to be the responsibility of the state 
alone and nonprofit institutions were relegated to a secondary position at best.  
The purpose of this article is to put the current pattern of state-nonprofit relations in France 
into historical context and to suggest the implications this experience may have for other 
countries that share the statist background that France—perhaps in somewhat different form—
also embodies. To do so, the discussion first reviews the current shape of the French nonprofit 
sector and the scope and structure of government support of nonprofit human service delivery 
in France. We then examine the unfavorable historical background out of which the current 
arrangements emerged and the set of changes that ultimately led to the existing pattern of 
extensive government-nonprofit cooperation in France. Against this background, a third section 
will then look more closely at the tools of action French governments are bringing to bear in 
their relations with nonprofits, and the advantages and drawbacks each involves. Also of 
interest here will be the nonprofit role in the formulation of public policies. Finally we examine 
the key challenges in government-nonprofit cooperation in the provision of human services and 
conclude with an outline of the features France may share with Russia. 
 
<H1>The Current Situation: The Scope and Structure of Government Support of 
Nonprofit Human Service Delivery in France 
 
<H2>Overview 
 
As outlined in Table I, with 913,000 employees (746,000 FTE), social services is by far the 
main component of the nonprofit sector in France (INSEE-CLAP 2012). 
<<<<Table I goes about here>>>> 
 
As shown in Table II, he nonprofit sector is also the main provider of social services, with 
62% of employment, putting it ahead of the public sector (28%) and the business sector (10%) 
(CNCRES 2014). Other nonprofit providers of human services follow far behind: health and 
education organizations are mainly public, with nonprofit employment in these two fields 
accounting for only 11% and 18% of total employment, respectively
c
 (INSEE-CLAP 2012). 
<<<<Table II goes about here>>>> 
The following subsections examine the relative roles and financing of the nonprofit sector 
in each of these components of the human service delivery system in a bit more detail, with a 
special focus on the interaction between the nonprofit sector and government at various levels.  
 
<H2>Education and Research 
 
Primary and secondary educationis mainly public, except for the 18% of its employment that is 
in nonprofit schools. Associations under the direction of the Catholic Church run 96% of these 
private nonprofit schools; the balance are Jewish or secular. The nonprofit schools are linked 
with the government by a contract (contrat d’association) according to which the state checks 
the qualifications of the teachers and pays them completely while local governments pay the 
administrative staff and for the maintenance of the schools. The schools have to accept every 
child regardless of his or her religion, but can expel some of them—they must follow the same 
programs as the public schools—but their staff choose the teachers and the pedagogy. One 
pupil out of five attends a private nonprofit school, but more in the Western part of France. As 
the comparative data of the French Ministry of Education show (Ministère de l’éducation 
nationale 2013) the results of the nonprofit schools are on average better than those of the 
public schools now (but that was not the case 20 years ago). This is due partly to their 
attraction of middle-class children while public schools have a higher proportion of immigrants 
and lower-class children, and partly to their smaller size and more innovative pedagogy. 
Recently, some for-profit enterprises were created to follow up on pupils in difficulty. 
Tertiary education is public or quasi-public. Nearly all universities are public, though they 
have gained increased autonomy over the last decade, but this autonomy is relative and they do 
not control their resources—nearly 100% of which come from public funding. Public 
universities are nearly free of charge. Business schools and a few engineering schools are run 
by the Chambers of Commerce, which are quasi-public organizations. Standard businesses 
entered recently into the field of tertiary education to prepare students for the most difficult 
competitive exams and the selective courses of study, but they represent a tiny part of the field. 
Given the high level of public funding in education, the fees are very low in nonprofit primary 
and secondary schools (US$150-900 per year) and higher in tertiary education (US$4000 to 
$8000 in business and engineering schools) but lower than in the USA. The origin of income 
of private nonprofit education—grants only, according to the number of pupils or students—is 
shown in Table III. 
<<<<Table III goes about here>>>> 
Secondary education is the main part of the nonprofit sector in education with 16% of the 
expense for education at that level, while primary and tertiary education represent less than 
10% of the public funding of education. Table III shows that the national government is the 
main funder by far at the two first levels, replaced by the Chambers of commerce for tertiary 
education. The regions, departments and municipalities are also growing funders in the last 
decade, during which we can observe a slight retrenchment on the part of the national state. 
In addition, and at the crossroads of education and culture, many quasi-school associations 
supply music, dance, performing arts, sports, and other initiations to culture to the students 
inside or outside  the schools. They are partly funded by the municipalities and partly by 
households. It is the same for adult education. The nonprofits specializing in vocational or on-
the-job training are funded through a dedicated tax (taxe de formation professionnelle) paid 
mainly by the enterprises that benefit from the training of their employees.  
 
<H2>Culture, Arts, and Performances 
 
A kind of division of labor is in place for the provision of arts, live performances, and other 
services of culture among the government at all levels, for-profit companies, and the nonprofit 
sector. The state and the local governments are in charge of the preservation of the historical 
monuments, and they run the largest museums, libraries, theatres, and concert halls either 
directly or through nonprofit organizations. The for-profit sector delivers entertainment and the 
most popular performances, such as concerts for the youth or bourgeois theatre. The nonprofit 
sector is specialized in the democratization of high level culture to youth, often in partnership 
with schools, and to adults as well. It also runs small museums, libraries of local interest, and 
cinema-clubs as well and multi-purpose culture and arts facilities owned by the government, 
such as the Maisons des Jeunes et de la Culture or Maisons de la Culture. The income of 
nonprofit culture organizations comes almost 52% from earned income (membership dues, 
sales of tickets, etc.), 4% from corporate giving, and 44% from public funding, mainly by the 
central government, the regions and the municipalities (Tchernonog 2013, p. 170). 
 
<H2> Health 
 
At the heart of the welfare state, the delivery of health services is more mixed than education. 
Hospitals are mainly public and two smaller parts are nonprofit or businesses, as shown in 
Table IV, but these two parts are declining.  
<<<<Table IV goes about here>>>> 
Public and nonprofit hospitals are free of charge and paid directly by the French social 
security system according to their activity. Private clinics are mainly funded by social security 
as a third party, but the patient has to pay a more or less important part according the clinic’s 
comforts, the fame of the doctors, and so on. 
Conversely, doctors and other professionals delivering health services outside the hospitals 
are paid, at least initially, by their patients; they are mainly private, self-employed individuals 
or they work in small standard enterprises, but they are highly regulated by the state and the 
social security system, which mainly reimburse their patients. Nonprofit hospitals and other 
human health activities represent 11% of the total delivery of health services. Nonprofit 
organizations are particularly active in the fields of cancer, rehabilitation of every kind of 
handicap, and drug and alcohol addiction treatment. All these specialties are labor-intensive.  
Table V shows the structure of total funding of health services in France; it is not very 
different for the public or private sector, and inside the private sector the nonprofit part is not 
isolated. The compulsory health insurance of the social security system is by far the main 
funder, followed by nonprofit mutuals and other nonprofit insuranceand then by the patient’s 
household. Commercial insurance corporations play a small but growing role. The state pays 
for the long-term unemployed or irregular immigrants not protected by the social security 
health insurance. 
<<<<Table V goes about here>>>> 
 
<H2>Social Services 
 
The delivery of social services is the realm of mixed welfare and interdependence between 
state, local governments, and social security, which pay for the services and control them, and 
nonprofit organizations, which provide the bulk of the actual delivery of services.  
There is a kind of division of labor in the provision of social services: the government gives 
money benefits to some parts of the population and provides basic and standard services to the 
whole population, such as information on existing social services. It also delivers the services 
linked to the standard governmental functions of police and justice, such as running 
establishments for pre-delinquents or juvenile delinquents, though in the last decade the 
management of these establishments was partly contracted out to nonprofit organizations. The 
nonprofit sector is in charge of services requiring labor-intensive follow-up, such as social 
work activities without accommodation (SWAWA) intended for long-term unemployed, frail 
persons, or minority groups. Nonprofit organizations run residential care for the mentally or 
physically disabled, the homeless and other persons in a situation of social exclusion, and, to a 
smaller extent, for the frail elderly. The business sector targets the high-income groups, mostly 
in elderly care, but its involvement in the social services field is lower than in health services. 
As noted above, the nonprofit sector is the major provider of social services. Table VI shows 
the picture at the subfield level. 
<<<<Table VI goes about here>>>> 
Except for home care and sheltered workshops for the disabled, the size of nonprofit 
establishments is smaller than the size of the public ones and therefore they are friendlier and 
less bureaucratic. In the subfields of services for people with disabilities, nonprofit 
organizations hold a quasi-monopoly, with well over 80 percent of the establishments and 
sizable majorities of the employees.   
Public funding accounts for 61% of the resources of nonprofit organizations in the health 
and social service fields, as shown in Table VII. 
<<<<Table VII goes about here>>>> 
To summarize, the situation with regard to the nonprofit delivery of social services 
currently is similar to the one in place more than fifteen years ago as the following quotation 
from a prior study makes clear (additions in italics to update empirical data): 
―The field of social services is characterized in France by a mixed structure, which has 
favored the enormous growth in this field of the third sector. The Johns Hopkins 
Comparative Project has shown that ―social services‖… is by far the major area of 
nonprofit involvement, in spite of the sustained expansion of governmental provision. In 
1990, this field accounted for 38.5 percent of total third sector employment employing 
about 300,000 wage earners (47 percent and 910,000 employees in 2011). Nonprofit 
employment in this field dominates employment in the area of social services 58 per cent of 
total employment (and 62 percent in 2011) and has almost doubled since 1980 (tripled 
since 1990) (Archambault and Boumendil 2002, p.109).‖ 
 
<H2>Summary: The Relative Position of the Nonprofit Sector in Human Service Delivery 
 
As a conclusion to the description of the mixed provision of human services in France, Table II 
above summarizes the relative positions of nonprofit organizations, for-profit companies, and 
government agencies at all levels in the delivery of various types of services, and in the 
economy as a whole.  
As this table shows, with 7.5% of overall French employment, the French nonprofit sector 
accounts for 62% of employment in social services, 27% of employment in culture and arts, 
and 19% of employment in education. To be sure, government agencies retain the lion’s share 
of both delivery and finance in the fields of education and health, but a powerful mixed 
economy has emerged in the other two fields—and particularly so in the field of social 
services—where a strong pattern of government-nonprofit cooperation has emerged. 
Therefore, the following parts of this chapter will focus particularly on this social services 
field, where the government-nonprofit partnership is most clearly in evidence. The next part 
shows how this government-nonprofit relationship evolved historically. 
 
<H1> Historical Background of the Welfare Mix 
 
The French nonprofit sector dates back to the Middle Ages with two pillars: the hospitals, 
asylums, schools, and other charities run by the Catholic Church and its congregations; and the 
more urban and secular network of guilds and brotherhoods organizing craftsmen and their 
employees. These two origins of nonprofit organizations can be found in most European 
countries (Salamon and Anheier 1996). But while the French Monarchy unified the nation early 
by joining regions through wars and marriages, many other European countries unified later; 
this is why France was and still is, despite two Decentralization Acts in 1983 and 2003, a 
centralized state while its European neighbors are really decentralized countries where most of 
the decisions on education, social, and cultural fields are the responsibility of local 
governments. This section outlines the main turning points of the history of the French 
nonprofit sector and highlights two trends that have strongly influenced its development: on the 
one hand, the systematic restrictions on nonprofit organizations imposed by a centralized and 
interventionist state in the wake of the French Revolution; and, on the other hand, the 
progressive secularization of the nonprofit sector in an old Catholic country. 
 
<H2>The French Revolution (1789-1799): A Great Break in the History of the Nonprofit 
Sector 
 
Before 1789, the French kings fought any form of local power or religious minorities, such as 
Protestants and Jews. The kingdom of France adopted Catholicism as the state religion. The 
Church was the main provider of human services. Parishes and congregations were at the origin 
of the charities: relief to the poor families and orphan defense and support; sick and elderly 
person care; and schools and other education institutions. In addition, in the urban areas, the 
guilds and the brotherhoods gave a beginning of social protection to the craftsmen and their 
employees. 
The French Revolution is the great break in the history of the nonprofit sector. The new 
Republic,  inspired by the philosopher Rousseau’s Contrat social, elevated the general interest 
represented by the democratic state and was hostile to partial interests represented by any form 
of association. Therefore, the Republic fought the Ancient Regime nonprofitsector’s two pillars: 
firstly, it took issue with the guilds (and the brotherhoods, their social and religious 
subsidiaries), as brakes to free enterprise and fair competition. Reflecting this, in 1791 the 
guilds were outlawed with this rationale: ―No one shall be allowed to arouse in any citizen any 
kind of intermediate interest and to separate him from the public weal through the medium of 
so-called common interests‖ (Archambault 1997). Later, the struggle of the anticlerical 
Republic against the Church, suspect of interfering in politics in favor of the Monarchy, had 
important consequences for their charitable organizations—hospitals and schools mainly—
which were either closed or nationalized while the Church's property and real estate were 
seized. Instead, the government stated that the welfare of the population was the government’s 
responsibility, but this principle would not be effectively implemented for 150 years.  
 
<H2> The Second Turning Point: The Liberal Laws at the End of the 19
th
 Century 
 
During the 19
th
 century successive governments authorized some nonprofit organizations, if 
they agreed with government policy, and some mutual societies to alleviate the poverty of the 
urban working class, but they fought against the emerging labor movement, the opposition’s 
political clubs, and some authorized charitable organizations that were thought to hide the 
forbidden labor unions or political opposition.  
The liberal laws in the last years of the 19
th
 century were the end of these restrictions to the 
freedom of association: labor unions were authorized in 1884; mutual societies in 1898; and all 
types of associations in 1901. The 1901 Law is the consecration of the freedom of association 
and the legal framework for most associations nowadays.
d
 It defines an association as a 
―contract according to which two or more individuals permanently pool knowledge or activity 
with an aim other than sharing profits.‖ When it has been created, an association may be 
declared. Undeclared associations have no legal rights. Declared associations have only limited 
legal rights—they are not allowed to own real estate except for their operation or to receive 
legacies. The aim of this limited legal capacity was to prevent the Church from passing off 
parishes or congregations as associations. ―State-approved‖ associations—fewer than 2000 
today, but the largest ones—have a full legal capacity and can own real estate and receive 
legacies. They have to be acknowledged by the Conseil d'Etat
e
 after a rather long and 
restrictive procedure. 
The beginning of the 20
th
 century thus marked a turning point: the nonprofit sector was no 
longer illegal, though foundations had no specific legal status. However, the growth of the 
nonprofit sector was very slow during the two World Wars and the inter-war period despite the 
fact that it was very easy and costless to create an association. And no government-nonprofit 
partnership appeared in this first half of the century despite the beginning, in the 1930s, of a 
corporatist social security system inspired by the German one. 
 
<H2>The Beginning of a Partnership Between the Central Government and the Nonprofit 
Sector After The Second World War 
 
The welfare state really emerged after WWII, in the 1945−1955 period of reconstruction. A 
new social security system, extended step by step to the whole population, covered the main 
social risks: sickness, old age, family burden, and unemployment. Social security delivered 
social benefits but no social services supplied partially by the central and local governments. 
However, the state began to support by grants and third party-payments private catholic 
schools
f
 and nonprofit organizations delivering services to the disabled, the poor, and the 
elderly, and to child day care under a regulation system described below.  
The Church-based organizations progressively ceased to run welfare establishments or 
services directly and the state or associations replaced them. This secularization trend began 
during the French Revolution and ended by the mid-20
th
 century. In previously Catholic 
welfare establishments, paid staff replaced volunteer nuns. This is why the French nonprofit 
sector is secular, except for Catholic schools, contrasting with the pillarization system of its 
Northern neighbors (Salamon et.al. 1999). 
After the post-war period of reconstruction, the nonprofit sector entered a boom period. In 
the 1950s, this associative boom was mainly the outcome of the effort of health or social 
service organizations born in the interwar period to achieve for physically and mentally 
handicapped civilian persons the same benefits as were provided for disabled veterans. These 
organizations then became the providers of the quasi-totality of welfare services and residential 
care facilities when the government began to support them financially. 
During the 1960s new demands led to new opportunities for nonprofit development. Thus, 
for example, the rise of working women created new needs for child care that the government 
could not meet alone, and new forms of child daycare were proposed by associated parents. 
Other nonprofits enhancing the democratization of culture were encouraged by the government 
as well as multipurpose associations disseminating high culture in a popular way to those who 
missed this opportunity at school because they had had to begin working early. 
Further impetus for the emergence of nonprofits resulted from the student uprisings in 
1968. The youth criticized all forms of authority and especially statism, state control, and the 
―consumption society.‖ A new spirit of individualism within the baby-boom generation gave 
rise to new fields of advocacy among nonprofits: feminism, birth control, environmental 
defense, aid to Third World countries, defense of human rights, immigrant mainstreaming, and 
others. These ideological trends influenced the delivery of human services as well. 
From the 1960s on, with constant economic growth and demographic and socio-cultural 
changes, civil society appeared to be more eager to initiate the provision of diversified services 
to specific parts of the population. The 1960s and 1970s were also a time of institutional and 
political debate, and of the emergence of laissez-faire ideologies questioning the advantages of 
a state-centralized policy in every public field. Paradoxically, these critics of the welfare state 
came mainly from some socialist circles belonging to the so called ―Second Left.‖ They 
denounced centralization, the inefficiency and waste of public human services, the weight of 
bureaucracy, and, most of all, the inadequacy of public procedures to cope with new or 
evolving needs (Rosanvallon 1981, 1995; Ullmann 1998). 
 
<H2>The Mitterrand Years (1981-1995): An Accelerator for the Nonprofit Sector 
 
The ideas of the ―Second Left‖ were implemented when the socialist government of Mitterrand 
was elected in 1981.
g
 The decentralization acts passed in 1982−1983 redistributed the 
responsibilities between the national state and local governments. New human service delivery 
activities and new resources were transferred to the local governments. As local governments 
were not equipped to deliver human services, and because the political philosophy had changed 
as well, local governments contracted out the bulk of the services that they could not provide 
directly. This gave rise to a significant expansion of local government-nonprofit partnerships in 
the provision of a wide array of services targeted to particular groups of the population.  
This expansion of government-nonprofit cooperation was also fuelled by growing social 
problems in the 1980s and into the 1990s. Included here was the marked rise of unemployment, 
and especially the beginning of long-term unemployment that led to the loss of social 
protections and to social exclusion. In response, many new nonprofits were created to provide 
―insertion through work,‖ while other nonprofits advocated against racism and all kinds of 
gender, sexual orientation, or ethnic discrimination. Along with the appearance of various 
―without borders‖ professional groups such as Medecins sans frontieres, the result was a surge 
in nonprofit formation. Between 1980 and 1985 alone, for example, the annual creation of 
nonprofit organizations jumped from 30,000 in 1980 to 50,000 in 1985. And this development 
continued into the new millennium with a surge in culture associations, organizations designed 
to integrate youth and drop-outs through sports and culture, and home care and other 
―proximity services‖ responding to the needs of the growing elderly population.  
In short, France has recently undergone a revolution of sorts in its social philosophy. Until 
the 1980s, France remained in the grip of the French Revolution’s ―Jacobin‖ philosophy 
holding that the national state held a monopoly on the definition and pursuit of the public 
benefit, and that it, and it alone, was responsible for delivering human services and ensuring 
that they were providing equally for the whole population. With the passage of the 
decentralization laws and the growth of government-nonprofit cooperation at the local level in 
the early 1980s, the political discourse and the operational realities changed dramatically. By 
the mid-1980s and beyond, little daylight was left between claims by politicians on the right 
that, as Chirac famously stated, ―[t]he state and the public authorities do not have a monopoly 
of the public good,‖ and those on the left that, in Jospin’s famous words, believed that ―the 
state cannot do everything.‖ 
 
<H1> The Tools of Action in Government-Nonprofit Relations   
 
While the changes introduced in the 1980s opened new arenas of social welfare policy and new 
modalities of operation, it hardly completely replaced the pre-existing Jacobin system. Under 
the Decentralization Acts (1982−1983), new activities and new resources were transferred to 
the local governments, but the core Social Security system remained centrally operated. What 
is more, some significant differences survived in the handling of different types of social 
services. Thus, for example, residential establishments, even those run by nonprofit 
organizations, are more or less quasi-public and are seen as such by the beneficiaries. Their 
level of government financing is very high and they are heavily regulated by state procedures. 
On the other hand, social work activities without accommodation (SWAWA) have more 
diversified resources and less extensive regulation, and are therefore more independent of 
thestate.  
Considerable diversity also surfaced in the tools of action deployed in government-
nonprofit relations. Some tools act on the supply of human services, and therefore on the 
providers, while others on the demand, mainly by raising the resources available to potential 
clients. Left wing governments prefer the first ones and Right wing governments the latter 
ones. Because of the political alternation and the tendency to add programs and laws without 
suppressing the existing ones, supply-side and demand-side tools coexist in France and they 
will be examined with the pros and cons of different stakeholders. 
 
<H2>The Recent Shift from Grants to Contracts in a Context of Neo-Managerialism  
 
From the 1960s on, the general pattern in France in the field of human services is one in which 
the state provides the standard and basic services directed toward the entire population and 
nonprofit organizations cope with more specific social needs or provide services to targeted 
populations (e.g., persons with disabilities, long-term unemployed, homeless). The state at its 
different levels delegates to nonprofits the deliveryof personal and specialized services directed 
toward minority groups and socially endangered populations, as well as responsibilities for 
responding to new, less defined, and highly specialized social needs, especially those involving 
moral support for socially disadvantaged populations and family relations. But the government 
or the social security system almost always provide the bulk of resources through grants and 
subsidies that vary in form according to the recipient. Thus, for example, assistance is 
provided: 
 As grants on an annual basis for culture organizations and small SWAWAs; 
 On a contractual basis over several years for private nonprofit schools and large 
SWAWAs;  
 As third party payments by the health insurance component of the social security 
system—though the basis of these payments changed in 2008 from annual grants to pre-
set payments determined by the social security based on the precise medical procedures 
carried out (tarification à l’activité); and  
 Residential care facilities are paid by social security or the central government on a per 
diem basis (number of residents x length of their stay in the facilities x price of a day of 
care). The per diem is negotiated every year between the two partners to reflect the 
actual costs of the past year. 
What are the advantages and drawbacks of grants and contracts for the respective parties? 
For the nonprofit organizations, grants and subsidies, especially when they cover several years, 
provide trust and security and the possibility to plan development and to innovate. The main 
drawback is the absence of competition and the risk of bureaucratization and resulting heavy 
overhead costs. For the central and local governments, grants can be politically attractive since 
employees and volunteers of nonprofit organizations delivering human services are also 
electors. In addition, the costs of services delivered through nonprofit organizations are 
generally lower than those directly provided by the state (Lanfranchi and Narcy 2008). 
Engaging nonprofit organizations is also a way to avoid expanding public employment, which 
is already very high in France. The drawback for the government is that it has no control over 
the results. In addition, recurrent or multi-year grants may lead to unexpectedpublic deficits. 
Also problematic have been some false associations that were created by the Right and Left 
governments to reroute public money into financing political campaigns.  
In response to such drawbacks and scandals, the European Union has urged countries to 
shift from outright grants to competitive contracts during the last decade. Under this 
arrangement, the central or the local governments define the quantity and the quality required 
in the delivery of a particular service and allocates the resources to the lowest bidder. For the 
government, this is a way to prevent the charge of favoritism or misuse of public money and to 
reduce the cost of human services and therefore the public deficits. The drawback is the 
standardization of the services, the lag between the tender and the actual supply of human 
services, and the bureaucratic burden for the organizations that bid. Smaller nonprofit 
organizations lack the qualified staff to fulfill the tender forms while the larger ones criticize 
this ―Anglo-Saxon‖ process as reducing their initiative and innovation and making them either 
subsidiaries of the public powers or businesses. In addition, this project-oriented competition 
often does not finance organizational overhead costs.   
 
<H2>Loans, Loans Guarantees, and Social  Investment 
 
Loans and loans guarantees are linked mainly with the capital expenditures of nonprofit 
organizations—construction, rehabilitation, or renewal of residential estate or other facilities—
and not with current expenses.  
Associations, as noted above, have significant limitations on their legal capacity.
h
 
Nonprofits have limited access to equity capital due to their inability to share profits with 
investors. Their access to borrowing in standard banks is uneasy with the exception of 
cooperative banks. However, the Caisse des dépots et consignations, a quasi-public bank that 
gathers and invests the money on savings passbooks, and, to a lesser extent, receives legacies 
while waiting for their division between heirs, has a specialized department to help nonprofit 
organizations and other social enterprises generate capital. A minor role is to lend money to the 
organizations with cash shortages to prevent bankruptcies. This department advises nonprofit 
organizations in difficulty as well.  
Loan guarantees are given either by the state, local governments, Caisse des dépots et 
Consignations, or foundations. The 2014 Law on Social and Solidarity Economy will give 
nonprofit organizations acting for the public benefit an automatic loan guarantee from the state.  
Loans and loans guarantees are not used by the bulk of French nonprofits because the 
smallest ones do not consider themselves as enterprises and prefer financing their equipment 
from cash-flow. They behave like French households that are less in debt than many of their 
European equivalents. However, large organizations behave like enterprises. Lending to 
nonprofit organizations is therefore an emergent market for banks, but the cooperative banks 
were first and they are eager to preserve their market share. 
Socially responsible investment and solidarity-based saving are more recent tools, 
emerging during the last two decades. In France, socially responsible investment refers to 
practice on the part of institutional investors such as the Caisse des depots et Consignations or 
the cooperative banks, mutual societies, life-insurance companies, or congregations, to select 
their shares in corporations not firstly on their financial performance, but mainly on their social 
and environmental impact. This includes both negative and positive screening. Solidarity-based 
saving is collected by companies on employee savings,
i
 if the employee decides to devote a 
percentage of this saving to a solidarity purpose, or by banks on dedicated securities. These 
savings are then invested in social enterprises or in nonprofit organizations. The saver can 
target one or several nonprofit organizations. This solidarity finance, which relies on positive 
screening, has grown rapidly since 2008 because of the criticisms of the banks’ behavior in 
France and elsewhere. However, according to representatives of Finasol
j
, the French social 
investment website, solidarity-based saving—more than 1 million savers and some US$7 
billion in 2014—is only about 0.2% of the very large French savings and therefore it may have 
substantial room to grow in the near future. 
Crowdfunding, which uses the Internet to match nonprofit organizations or social 
enterprises with savers, is also an emergent tool.  
 
<H2>Tax Expenditures 
 
Associations and foundations are exempted in most cases from the three taxes on businesses: 
tax on corporate profits; value added tax; and local property tax. However, they do pay a 
payroll tax. To decide if an organization has to pay the three corporate taxes, the tax authority 
applies the following criteria in the following order:  
1. Is the presumed nonprofit organization really non-profit-distributing? If not, it is taxed. 
2. Is the organization in competition with standard businesses? If not, it is exempted. 
3. Is the organization  providing the same ―product‖ (or service) as standard enterprises to 
the same ―public‖ with the same ―prices‖ and the same ―publicity‖ (rule of the 4Ps)? If 
one of these Ps is different, the organization is exempted. 
Since the implementation of this rule in 1998, which followed long discussions between the 
tax authority and the representatives of the nonprofit sector, there are no longer claims of unfair 
competition by the business sector and the bulk of nonprofit organizations are tax-exempted. In 
the field of human services, elderly homes and some youth residential facilities are the only 
organizations to pay taxes.  
Tax expenditures to enhance individual and corporate giving are very generous in France. 
These tax expenditures have grown dramatically since 1996. The organizations that are acting 
in defined public-benefit fields receive donations that are eligible for the following tax 
exemptions: 
 For contributions of donors to all nonprofit organizations: a credit against taxes owed 
of 66% of the donation, with a cap of 20% of income. To enhance the creation of 
foundations,  the donation over the cap can be deducted over the following 5 years. 
 For contributions to foundations only, except corporate foundations: a tax credit of 
75% of the donation against the property tax (Impôt sur la fortune)paid by the wealthiest 
part of the population, with a cap of US$65,000.  
 Legacies to public-interest nonprofit organizations are totally exempted from the 
inheritance tax. 
 Corporate giving, directly or through corporate foundations, receives a tax credit of 
60% of the amount of the donation with a cap of 0.5% of the turnover. 
These tax expenditures are more efficient for corporate than for individual donations. 
Despite the fact that, since 2009, the new alleviation of Impôt sur la fortunehas had great 
success, French individuals increased their generosity by the exact increase in tax expenditure 
and their true generosity remains limited (Facq and Landais 2009). However, the exemption of 
inheritance tax for contributions to nonprofit organizationshas been linked with more legacies 
in the last decade, and since 2003 the creation of foundations has been more rapid than 
previously. Corporations were more responsive to the growth of tax expenditures and they 
created many corporate foundations that are new actors in the nonprofit landscape 
(Archambault 2003). 
 
<H2>Vouchers or Equivalents  
 
Vouchers are a way to increase the income of the client or beneficiary of a human service. 
They are therefore tools on the demand side of the human services quasi-markets, as opposed 
to the preceding tools acting on the providers, or the supply side. In France, vouchers are given 
to the frail elderly and the disabled mainly to pay for residential care, home care services, or 
specialized devices (Allocation personnalisée d’autonomie for the elderly; Allocation de 
compensation du handicap for the disabled).  These vouchersvary according to the income and 
the degree of dependency of the elderly and the disabled. It is paid either directly to the person 
if he/she stays at home, and can be used only to buy care services in the home, or to the 
residential facility if the person is institutionalized. These vouchers are paidpartially by the 
state and mainly by the departement. Vouchers also pay for holiday camps for children and 
their families (cheque vacances). These vouchersare amix of public money, corporate money of 
the employer, and savings of the household itself.  
In addition, fees for human services often vary according to family income as is the case for 
day care of young children or holiday camps for youth. 
The benefits of vouchers are mixed: on the one hand, a voucher gives to the client the 
opportunity to choose his/her provider and therefore enhances competition among the 
providers; on the other hand, if the person is mentally frail, the choice is done by others and 
some embezzlement can happen. 
 
<H2>Public Regulation 
 
The large-scale delegation of responsibilities in the field of social services to nonprofit 
organizations has been accompanied by various regulations related to the creation, costs and 
activities (standards of quality, qualification and recruitment of employees, etc.) of nonprofit 
establishments. This field is indeed one of the most regulated areas of activity in Franceas 
nonprofit organizations are filling a public ―social mission‖ (mission de service public).  
Different kinds of procedures allow the state to establish general regulations in this field:  
 As part of the general social security scheme, social establishments are subjected to a 
process of authorization, called habilitation, involving an a priori control of their project 
and its feasibility, and then leading to state financing (accréditation); 
 The majority of the nonprofit organizations active in this field also have to receive an 
agreement (agrément). The agreement is, first, a kind of official recognition of the quality 
of activities performed in special fields; but overall and very often, these activities are 
possible only if the organizations carrying them out receive this agreement. This means 
that the organization has been given a kind of monopoly by the state to perform certain 
state-authorized activities that other organizations are prevented from carrying out, such 
as residential care for the elderly. ―Agreed organizations‖ receive a variety of advantages. 
They are entitled to automatic (and automatically renewed) access to public funding 
covering almost all expenditures involved in running the establishments, either through 
per-diem reimbursements or through global grants. Global grants are distributed to 
establishments which are under the responsibility of the state, and per-diem 
reimbursements are provided to organizations supported through the social security 
system. Finally, the agreement allows some associations to bring actions before court for 
causes related to their aim—a very special exception to the French legal principle that no 
one is allowed to advocate somebody else's cause before a court. 
In return for these advantages, however ―agreed associations‖ must accept strict 
avoidance of the conflicts of interest and financial solvency conditions. Similarly, special 
statutes and by-laws have to be accepted by the membership and, in some cases, members 
must accept Ministry designation of the President and some members of the board. So, 
too, the books, the activity, and the general operation come under the control of the state 
administration (Inspection générale des affaires sociales, Cour des comptes). In short, the 
association becomes a kind of mixed entity, half private and half part of the public 
administration. In other words, for these residential care nonprofit organizations, the 
fundings are quite routinized, even during financial crises; but on the other hand, these 
nonprofit organizations become agents of the government (Archambault and Boumendil 
2002). 
 
<H1> The Nonprofit Role in Policy Formulation  
 
Nonprofit organizations have recently played a leading role in the definition of social policy in 
France where the attitude of the state has been that of letting the existing organizations 
organize the field to restrict the costs, and then taking on the funding responsibility. For that 
reason, one can assume that this field corresponds to the ―partnership type‖ of relationship 
between the state and nonprofit organizations, defined by Salamon (1995). But the state always 
gives the final coherence to the policy. By virtue of their role as implementers of social welfare 
programs, nonprofit organization leaders acquire very specialized skills that the Government 
and the Parliament cannot have because they are multipurpose—so a tight collaboration helps. 
As noted below, this can range from virtual co-construction of a public policy to the mere 
exercise of influence. 
 
<H2>Co-construction of  Public Policy: The Laws on the Disabled – 1975, 2002, 2005 
 
As noted above, in the 1960s, children and adults with disabilities were mainly institutionalized 
in very specialized facilities created by their organizations. In the 1970s, after some claims of 
ill-treatment, the government decided to legislate. After two years of discussion with the 
representatives of the two main organizations (Association des paralyses de France for 
physical and UNAPEI for mentally disabilities), a 1975 Law formulated the above described 
regulation on the facilities intended for the persons with disabilities. After the same 
consultation, a 2002 law clarified the rights of persons with disabilities in a residential facility 
and in ordinary life as well (a few years later the same rights were formulated for patients 
inside hospitals). Finally, in 2005, the 1975 Law was revised in partnership with the same 
nonprofit organizations: persons with disabilities were guaranteed a personal right to 
compensation for a variety of dedicated human services (the above described voucher 
Allocation de Compensation du handicap) in addition to a money allowance (Allocation pour 
adulte handicapé) that all the persons with disabilities receive. 
Another example of the co-construction of policy between government and nonprofits is the 
role that the main charities acting for the poorest played in the development of the 1998 law on 
exclusion and its recent up-date. More recently, there was a two-year long preliminary 
discussion of the law on Social and Solidary Economy with the representatives of cooperatives, 
mutual societies, associations, and foundations before the law was adopted in July 2014. 
 
<H2> Increased Policy Experimentation  
 
As a centralized country, France has a principle of equality on the whole territory that makes it 
difficult to experiment with public policies on a part of the territory. But this experimentation is 
possible through nonprofit organizations. The best example is the Law guaranteeing a 
minimum income. Official passage of this law followed a long-term de facto cooperation 
between nonprofit organizations and public authorities, especially in employment policy and 
health and social activities. Associations helped employment policy by running, with 
significant public financing, job-training programs, especially for unskilled workers. From 
1984 to 1987, nonprofit organizations involved in the poverty plans met with local government 
officials and social housing managers to develop a more durable poverty policy in the form of a 
guaranteed minimum income. In deprived industrial areas, such as the Northeastern part of 
France, the third sector cooperated with local government to provide help and income support 
to the unemployed new poor. The Wresinski
k 
report, adopted in 1987, was the fruit of this 
experimentation and laid the foundation for the draft of the 1988 minimum income for 
integration (RMI) policy. The Wresinski report recommended the extension of local 
experiments of minimum income with the participation of nonprofits to enable the poor to join 
the mainstream and asked for ―a tight collaboration between various partners engaged in the 
fight against poverty.‖ 
More recently, we can also observe that the new ―helped jobs‖ to fight youth 
unemployment, emplois d’avenir, originated in nonprofit organizations before their legal 
implementation—and now nonprofit organizations are explicitly identified as potential 
employers for these new contracts. Another example is afforded by associations working on 
immigration issues. In recent years, they have developed literacy and adult training programs, 
school help to the children of immigrants, sports clubs and recreation clubs, Muslim activities, 
education and mutual help for women, legal assistance, and aid for administrative problems. 
Local government encouraged the creation of such nonprofit organizations with in-kind and 
financial support when such organizations were nonexistent, and this pedagogic 
experimentation was acknowledged by official diplomas. 
 
<H2> Other Forms of Involvement of Nonprofit Organizations in the Definition of Public 
Policies 
 
Nonprofit organizations have also influenced public policy through other channels as well. For 
example, some nonprofit leaders, such as Bernard Kouchnerand Martin Hirsch, became 
Ministers. Owing to their former experience, these civil society leaders initiate laws in favor of 
the nonprofit sector—such as the 2010 law on the civic service, which gives to a part of the 
unemployed youth the opportunity to ―volunteer‖ from six months up to two years in a public 
interest organization or public agency and to be paid half the minimum wage by the state. 
The High Council of Associative Life (Haut Conseil de la Vie Associative), a body 
grouping high-level leaders of the large nonprofit organizations and representatives of the 
concerned administrations, has to be consulted on every law or decree having an impact on the 
nonprofit sector. The same kind of consultation exists for the official statistical data on 
nonprofit organizations and other social economy enterprises, a new statistical field for the 
French statistical office (INSEE). 
There are also regular consultations by the Parliament with actors and experts from the 
nonprofit sector on how to improve existing and contemplated laws. Nonprofits have also 
recently been collaborating with the administrations that fund them to build the tools of 
evaluation of their actions and the public policies that affect them. Finally, a Charter of 
reciprocal commitments was signed by 14 nonprofit leaders and 14 Ministers on the occasion 
of the centenary of the Law of 1901 on associations.
l
 
 
<H1> Key Issues in Government-Nonprofit Cooperation in the Provision of Human 
Services 
 
<H2> Accountability and Transparency:Legal Obligations but No Efficient Public Control 
 
All nonprofit organizations, in principle, have to publish annual financial statements and 
discuss them during the annual general meeting of their members. The board also has to present 
a substantive report on the activity of the past year. These documents have to be published on 
the organization’s website—but many organizations do not do so, and many have no websites. 
For nonprofit organizations with an income over US$198,000, the accounts must be checked 
by an external certified auditor. For organizations funded by charitable donations, the accounts 
must be presented according to a template showing how the donations are used and the sources 
and origins of the contributed revenue. There is no ceiling on overhead and fundraising costs or 
reserves, but these are key points for the control and monitoring agencies whether public or 
private.  
The public a posteriori control is done either according to the field of action of the 
nonprofit organization (e.g., Inspection générale des affaires sociales for social services, 
Inspection de l’éducation nationale for education services), or in a more general way by a 
special public body, the Cour des comptes, and its regional subsidiaries, the Chambres 
régionales des comptes. But the Cour des comptes controls in depth only 3 or 4 large 
fundraising organizations each year and that is why private for-profit or nonprofit organizations 
of control mushroom.   
 
<H2>Consequences of the Shift from Grants to Contracts on the Traditional Functions of 
Nonprofit Organizations 
 
The recent appearance of bidding contracts has created a hard competition among nonprofits 
and between nonprofits and businesses, especially in the fields of retirement homes and home 
services. The competition among nonprofit organizations eliminates the smaller ones that have 
no time and no staff to fulfill the forms and compete with success. The shift to contracts 
therefore leads to the concentration of the nonprofit sector. This has some benefits in a country 
with so many small organizations, but there are two risks: on the one hand, nonprofit 
organizations may be confined to unprofitable activities, as the commercial companies cream 
the market for the rich or the less disabled, and let the nonprofit organizations handle the 
assistance to poor people; on the other hand, nonprofit organizations could be tempted to select 
the solvent clients, or the powerful groups of clients, to the detriment of equity. These risks of 
creaming exist in other fields and are worrisome in a period of deep social exclusion and 
increased poverty (Archambault and Boumendil 2002). 
A new dilemma appears with the great recession beginning in 2008 in France. The impact 
of the financial, economic, and social crisis on the French third sector is very hard with a 
scissor effect: more social needs and poverty and less public funding. During the 2008-2011 
period, the reduction of grants and contracts paid by the state was compensated by the regions, 
the départements, and the local communities. But now the local governments no longer 
compensate the retrenchment of the state because all the levels of government have deficits. 
Donations remain flat despite more generous tax incentives. Increasing fees and other 
commercial resources contradicts the aim of the largest part of nonprofit organizations. For the 
first time since WWII employment in the nonprofit sector stopped growing in 2011 and 2013 
(ACOSS 2014), and in some fields, such as culture or home care, some nonprofit organizations 
began to go bankrupt. Will it be the end of a success story?  
<H2>Advocacy or Bureaucracy? 
 
Confronted with strong public regulations in terms of accountability and technicity, nonprofit 
organizations asking for public money are subjected to a bureaucratic isomorphism (Di Maggio 
and Powell 1993; Enjolras 1996). Some have become professional organizations and rely less 
on volunteers. Financial dependency on public financing can also be a source of inertia, as 
some of nonprofit organizations have turned out to be as institutionalized and as rigid as the 
public bureaucracies. Their capacity to react to new situations is sometimes low, and their 
advocacy role is declining. But one has to say that there is no automatic link between the size 
of public financing and the degree of autonomy of the nonprofit organization.  
Once again, the evolution of the associations of people with disabilities can serve as 
examples of the impact of these pressures. Although they were based on advocacy and 
volunteer participation in the 1950s, the majority of nonprofit organizations in this field are 
now quasi-public organizations, and their main concerns are linked with management. There is 
today no tendency for the self-help groups to increase their membership, as the rights of people 
with disabilities and their interests are well protected. Moreover, the search for group identity, 
initially at the root of these movements, now seems to have almost disappeared. Therefore, the 
democratic base of these establishments is sometimes quite small. Because of the decline of 
volunteer participation, and decrease in member attendance at general meetings, these 
establishments have also become disconnected from their members and sometimes feel at a 
distance from family preferences and users’ rights to the detriment of equity (Bloch-Lainé 
2010; Laville 2010). 
Roughly speaking, the provision of services is sometimes considered to be inconsistent 
with the advocacy role by nonprofit leaders themselves; that is why we generally observe a 
kind of specialization among nonprofit organizations—the organizations managing residential 
facilities create some branches whose aim is advocacy and nothing else. These advocacy 
organizations have their own ways of financing, through donations and grants.  
 
<H2>Stability or  Innovation? 
 
The innovation function of nonprofit organizations is linked to their capacity toreact rapidlyto a 
changing environment and to afford non-bureaucratic solutions to new social issues. Nonprofit 
organizations surface unmet needs that cannot be addressed through the market and find ways 
to cope with them, as they are deeply rooted in local communities. Nonprofits also have the 
capacity to approach problems in a holistic fashion, contrary to the administrations, which 
compartmentalize policies: employment, income, health, social and family position, housing, 
education, and skills. But innovation is often a characteristic of young associations, and if they 
manage to obtain important public financing they become more bureaucratic and less 
innovative 
Examples can be found in many fields: for example, ―insertion enterprises‖ produce goods 
or services in sectors overlooked by businesses, and at the same time, they supply temporary 
jobs and training to people in social difficulty, such as unskilled young people, potential or 
former delinquents, and drug addicts. These associations participate in the public policies 
against social marginalization in the town suburbs, but if the local governments are their unique 
client they behave as businesses and became less innovative. 
Once again, it is very important in the analysis of the role of nonprofit organizations in 
terms of innovation to separate residential care facilities and the other social services. The 
building-up of institutions has been both a source of innovation and paralysis. There is now a 
tendency against institutionalization, which is considered a way of imprisonment. These kinds 
of organizations limit innovation because their main aim becomes to survive as an institution. 
Bloch-Lainé (1994) insisted on the ability of the association to be short-lived and therefore less 
institutionalized and more able to give impetus for social change than public agencies. This is 
all the more important as France is a very bureaucratic country.  
 
<H2>Professionalization or Volunteering?  
 
The early secularization of social services in France was accompanied by a movement toward 
professionalization, which is still under way. Nearly all the professional careers in the social 
service field began as volunteer activities. The first social workers, before and during the first 
World War, were single, middle-class, Catholic, volunteer women. After the war, the 
qualifications of these women were acknowledged, they received social visibility, and new 
professions, professional organizations, vocational education programs, and specific diplomas 
were created. One of the most innovative roles of volunteeringis indeed to initiate and 
experiment with new types of jobs and to create new skills, especially relational skills, which 
are becoming more and more important on the labour market. For instance, being a former 
alcoholic, drug-addict, or prostitute qualifies the volunteer to fight against these social diseases 
and assist the victims; of course, this kind of qualification is not written in curriculum vitae for 
the labour market. Indeed, this role of prospecting new jobs is essentially played by volunteers, 
and then by the wage earners of nonprofit organizations. Thus, volunteer nurses and nuns 
became salaried nonprofit employees. But public financing is also partly responsible for this 
movement towards professionalization, since it requires understanding of the financing 
processes, preparation of regular reports, negotiation for the funds and so on. Finally, the 
initiative for the creation of nonprofit organizations has also come sometimes from 
professionals who wanted to create their own jobs.  
Generally speaking, volunteers are now rarely involved in the management of residential 
care establishments since agreements and contracts impose professional skills. In these 
organizations, volunteer involvement is limited to participation on the board of directors or to 
visiting the residents. But volunteers are still very active in advocacy organizations or smaller 
organizations, such as those dealing with the rare illnesses and defending research on these so-
called ―orphan diseases.‖ Three quarters of the time, of voluntary workers go to associations 
without paid staff (Prouteau and Wolff 2004; Tchernonog (2013); Prouteau and Wolff 2013; 
Flahaut and Tabaries 2013). 
But we cannot speak of the end of volunteerism, even in staffed nonprofit organizations. 
Indeed, surveys show that volunteering and employment of professionals develop 
concomitantly in the field of health and social services; in 2011, the hours of volunteer work in 
these two fields represented about 25% of total volunteering in France, or about 266,000 FTE 
employees (Prouteau 2013). That is much more than twenty years earlier—the ratio of 
volunteers to professionals is even increasing. But volunteers are involved in management, co-
ordination, contact with the public powers, and representative activities as board or committee 
members in large organizations, while they are more multi-purpose in smaller organizations.  
 
<H1> Conclusion 
 
France shares with Russia a long-standing tradition of centralization and monopoly of the 
government in the delivery of human services and in the definition of the common good. 
However, since the 1960s, this monopoly was step by step eroded in France by the growing 
difficulty to provide and finance more human services—longer schooling, more training, more 
health care to a population living a longer life, and multiple social services for ever more varied 
―social cases‖ and for a population diversified by immigration. It was also challenged by the 
impossibility of increasing the already too-high number of civil servants and other public 
employees, the criticisms of the too-bureaucratic and sometimes inefficient public services, and 
finally the necessity to decentralize the public powers to meet the more common Western 
European pattern inside the European Union. That is why the Jacobin tradition, deeply rooted 
in the French administration, was progressively supplanted in a large part of the political 
parties and public opinion, giving rise, among other things, to the an expanded pattern of 
government-nonprofit partnership. This progressive privatization of the delivery of human 
services was more oriented towards the nonprofit sector than the market because, at the same 
time, a more educated population desired to cope with the new social issues with innovative 
projects, and nonprofit organizations offered a convenient way to achieve this. The volunteers 
and employees of the nonprofit sector also prefer this sector’s democratic and participatory 
governance pattern over the very hierarchic governance inside the public and business sectors. 
While far from perfect, the result is a productive collaboration between government and 
nonprofit organizations that has generally served the country well. As Russia and the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as farther east, confront similar challenges, they may 
therefore find in the French experience some useful lessons that could be adapted to their own 
circumstances.  
 
 
Notes 
a
This article was prepared within the framework of a subsidy granted to the National Research 
University Higher School of Economics, Russian Federation by the Government of the Russian 
Federation for the implementation of the Global Competitiveness Program. None of the 
organizations with which the author is affiliated or that have supported her work bears any 
responsibility for any errors or views expressed here. That is the author’s own responsibility. 
b
Three levels of elected local governments exist in France: the roughly 36,000 communes, or   
municipalities; the 96 départements; and the 22 régions. Now the possibility of suppressing one 
level (the department) and merging régions and communes is on the apolitical agenda to 
simplify the administration and reduce its cost. 
c
 The statistical knowledge of the nonprofit sector was nearly non existent three decades ago 
(Archambault 1984). The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project Phase 1 and 2 
supplied the first complete data for the benchmark years 1990 and 1995-2000 (Archambault 
1997; Salamon et.al. 1999). Then, other scholars made repetitive organization surveys 
(Tchernonog 2007 and 2013) or built a satellite account of  nonprofit institutions (Kaminski 
2005; Archambault and Kaminski 2009). It was only in 2005 that INSEE, the French statistical 
office, decided to build annual empirical data on the social economy and to launch a first 
survey on nonprofit institutions in 2014 (Archambault et. al. 2010).  
d
 In a country with an inflationary production of laws, there are few examples of laws over a 
century old.  
e
 Conseil d’Etat is the highest court for public law conflicts. 
f
 The ―school war‖ between Catholic and ―without God‖ schools has indeed been constant in 
France throughout the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries, but it has been declining since the 1960s when 
the Catholic schools signed contracts with the State. 
g
 Pierre Mauroy and Michel Rocard, two Prime ministers of Président Mitterrand chaired two 
of these ―Second Left‖ circles  before 1981 (Loi cadre ESS 2014). 
h
This limited legal capacity will be replaced by a full capacity for public interest nonprofit 
organizations when the 2014 Law on Social and Solidarity Economy is implemented.   
i
The employee savings plans allow employees to be financially associated with the proper 
functioning of their company and/or to constitute a savings by means of one. One third of 
employees choose enter into such plans. 
j 
See http://www.finansol.org/ for more information about this organization. 
k
Father Joseph Wresinski was the very charismatic founder of ATD-Quart-Monde, a charity 
fighting extreme poverty in which the volunteers commit themselves to live several years 
where and how the poor live. 
l
After the changing of the political majority in 2002, this Charter was not implemented. 
Recently, this Charter was updated and declined by the regions. 
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 Table I 
Nonprofit establishments with staff and nonprofit employment, by field, France, 2012 
Field 
 
Nonprofit 
establishmen
ts 
with staff 
Employee 
headcounts 
(thousands) 
FTE 
employees 
(thousands) 
% of 
nonprofit 
FTE 
Social services  33,236 913 746  46.9% 
Education, training, and research  20,698 338 287  18.1% 
Health 4,656 173 147  9.2% 
Culture, arts, and performances 57,428 110   95  6.0% 
Other sectors  (including sports 
and recreation) and n.e.c. 
72,745 352 315  19.8% 
TOTAL 188,763 1,886 1,590  100.0% 
Source:INSEE-CLAP, Tableaux harmonisés de l’ Economie sociale, 2012. 
Methodological note: Nonprofit organizations include associations and foundations and the 
nonprofit health and social establishments run by mutual societies (about 1,300). Most nonprofit 
organizations have only one establishment. According to an agreement between INSEE and 
CNCRES to define the scope of social economy it does not include worship organizations, 
political parties, labor unions, and business and trade unions despite their legal status is 
association. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table II 
Structure of employment in human service delivery, and in the overall 
economy, by sectors, France, 2011 
Field    
Share of employment by sector 
TOTAL Private 
nonprofit 
Other 
private 
Public 
Social services 62% 10% 28% 100% 
Culture 27% 37% 36% 100% 
Education 19% 5% 76% 100% 
Health 12% 23% 65% 100% 
Social services 62% 10% 28% 100% 
Employment in 
the whole 
economy 
7.5% 67% 25.5% 100% 
Source:INSEE-CLAP processed by CNCRES 2014. 
Methodological note: “Other private‖ includes cooperatives and mutuals, 
which are companies with limited profit and democratic governance. 
Along with associations and foundations, these organizations are 
components of the social economy (10.3% of total employment). As 
INSEE-CLAP data include only staffed organizations, the part of the 
public sector is overestimated in the field of health compared to ―other 
private‖ because there are many self-employed in this field (doctors, 
independent nurses, etc.). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table III 
Structure of funding of private nonprofit education by level and type of funder, France, 2012 
Type of nonprofit  
education organization 
 
National 
governmen
t 
Local 
government
s 
Other (family, 
enterprises, 
Chambers of 
Commerce, 
etc.) 
TOTAL 
Primary education (n=US$4.4 
bn) 
51.6% 23.5% 24.8% 100.0% 
Secondary education (n= 
US$11.5) 
66.7% 9.0% 24.3% 100.0% 
Tertiary education (n=US$1.7 
bn) 
9.7% 15.3% 75.0% 100.0% 
TOTAL (n=US$17.6 bn)    
100.0
% 
Source:Ministère de l’éducation nationale, DEPP 2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table IV 
Structure of hospital field, France, 2012 
 
Percentage 
of hospitals 
(N=2,710) 
Percentage  
of  beds 
(N=416,710
) 
Public sector 35% 63% 
Nonprofit sector 26% 14% 
For-profit sector 38% 23% 
TOTAL  100% 100% 
Source:INSEE Tableaux de l’économie française, 2013. 
 
 
 
 
Table V 
Structure of funding of health services field, France, 2010 
 2010 
Social security 75.8% 
Central government (for the poorest) 1.2% 
Complementary insurance 13.6% 
Mutuals and other nonprofit insurance 10.0% 
For-profit insurance corporations 3.6% 
Patients 9.4% 
TOTAL  100% 
Source:INSEE Tableaux de l’économie française, 2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table VI 
Role of the nonprofit sector in the delivery of social services, 
by sub-field, France, 2011 
 
Percentage 
of 
establishmen
ts 
Percentage of 
FTE employees 
Sheltered workshops 91.7% 93.7% 
SWAWA  for disabled children 90.6% 91.7% 
Home care 58.6% 75.7% 
SWAWA to disabled or elderly 
adults 
83.6% 72.2% 
Residential care facilities 60.2% 52.7% 
SWAWA for children or teenagers 62.2% 52.4% 
Other social services 63.5% 49.1% 
Day care for young children  50.9% 44.2% 
TOTAL nonprofit sector 62.1% 60.3% 
Source:INSEE-CLAP, processed by CNCRES, 2014. 
 
Table VI 
Nature and origin of funding of nonprofit social service and health organizations, France, 2011 
Nature and origin of funding 
 
Social and health 
service 
organizations 
Humanitarian 
charities 
Total staffed  
nonprofitsector 
Private resources 39.0% 30.0% 46.0% 
Membership dues 1.8% 2.8% 8.7% 
Individual and corporate 
giving  
1.8% 16.1% 3.5% 
Payment of the 
client/beneficiary 
35.3% 11.1% 33.5% 
Public funding 61.0% 70.0% 54.0% 
Municipalities 7.5% 8.3% 10.9% 
Department 22.8% 6.9% 14.0% 
Region  0.5% 6.7% 3.9% 
State 15.3% 14.1% 12.7% 
European Union 0.1% 6.0% 1.3% 
Social Security and other 15.0% 48.9% 11.5% 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Tchernonog, 2013. 
Methodological note: Social service and health are not separate; because of the aging of the 
population, social residential care facilities are increasingly also serving as health providers. 
They welcome the whole population while humanitarian charities work for the poorest. Total 
nonprofit sector does not include the numerous smallest organizations with no staff. 
